Results of a test of three alternative models of the conditions necessary for employee ownership to positively influence employee attitudes are reported. Based on a study of 37 employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) companies (N of individuals = 2,804), results support hypotheses for the extrinsic and instrumental satisfaction models. Average company ESOP satisfaction and organizational comrnitment are high and average company turnover intention is low when the ESOP provides substantial financial benefits to employees, when management is highly committed to employee ownership, and when the company maintains an extensive ESOP communications program. In contrast, the results provide no support for the intrinsic satisfaction model of ESOP effects.
37 employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) firms. An explication of the basic ESOP structure and a review of previous theory and research on employee ownership precedes the presentation and discussion of the research results.
Employee Stock Ownership Plans
Employee stock ownership plans are deferred employee benefit plans through which employees acquire company stock. Only rarely do employees actually buy the stock themselves, either directly or through wage concessions. Rather, the company gives employees stock as a benefit (in addition to salary and other benefits). More specifically, an ESOP company annually donates stock, or cash to buy stock, to an ESOP trust. Company contributions to the ESOP trust are tax deductible for the company (and remain so under the 1986 revision of the federal tax code). Stock in the trust is allocated to employees' individual accounts, usually based on employee salary. Typically, all full-time employees over the age of 21 are automatically included in the plan after I year of service with the company.
Employees' ESOP accounts vest over time. That is, employees earn a gradually increasing right to their allocations, usually 0% for the first 1 to 3 years and increasing regularly to reach 100% after 10 years. Employees receive the vested portion of their ESOP accounts when they leave the company, or in some companies, only when they reach retirement age (even if they had left the company prior to retirement). On receiving their vested ESOP shares, employees in privately held companies may sell their shares back to the company for the current fair market value of the stock. Employees in publicly held ESOP companies may sell their shares on the stock market.
In publicly traded companies, employees must be able to vote their ESOP shares. Privately held companies are required to grant ESOP participants voting rights on a limited number of issues, although they may give employees full voting rights.
Approximately 7,000 U.S. companies have ESOPs. (The re-maining 1,000 employee ownership companies in the United States are worker cooperatives or have employee stock purchase plans.) Employee stock ownership plans exist in companies of all sizes and industries (ESOP Association, 1982; Marsh & McAUister, 1981) . The majority of ESOP companies are privately held and relatively small, with 500 or fewer employees (ESOP Association, 1982; Marsh & McAllister, 1981) . The typical ESOP owns between 20% and 40% of company stock, although employees own a majority of company stock in approximately 10% of all ESOPs (Marsh & McAllister, 1981; Rosen et al., 1986) . Employee buyouts to rescue failing firms represent only 1 or 2% of all ESOPs (Marsh & McAllister, 1981; Rosen & Klein, 1983) . More commonly, companies install ESOPs for one or more of the following reasons: (a) to provide an employee benefit, (b) to provide an incentive for employee effort, (c) to fulfill management's philosophical commitment to shared ownership, (d) to gain tax advantages, (e) to finance capital acquisitions, (f) to purchase the shares of a retiring owner, (g) to finance employee purchase of the company during a corporate divestiture, or (h) to transfer from public to private ownership. More detailed explanations of ESOPs appear in Kaplan and Ludwig (1985) and in Weyher and Knott (1985) .
Employee Ownership Theory and Research
The employee ownership literature suggests three alternative, but not mutually exclusive, models of the psychological effects of employee ownership. Underlying each of the three models is the assumption that if employees are satisfied with the employee ownership plan, they will feel committed to the company and motivated to keep working there. Each model predicts that different employee ownership conditions are associated with high employee satisfaction with stock ownership, high organizational commitment, and low turnover intentions.
The first model is the intrinsic satisfaction model of employee ownership. This model suggests that the simple fact of ownership (ownership qua ownership) increases employees' commitment to and satisfaction with the company. Tannenbaum (1983) , for example, posited that "ownership is attractive to most people .... Being an owner is ego enhancing" (p. 251). Long (1978a Long ( , 1978b argued that employee ownership creates a common interest among employees and increases employees" organizational identification. According to this model, the benefits of employee ownership derive directly from ownership, not from a more specific characteristic of the employee ownership plan or of the company as a whole. Thus, the intrinsic satisfaction model is sometimes described as the "direct effects" model of employee ownership (Tannenbaum, 1983) .
To test the intrinsic satisfaction model, researchers have typically adopted one of three strategies: (a) examination of the relation between employee attitudes and the number of shares owned by the employee (French & Rosenstein, 1984; Hammer & Stern, 1980) , (b) comparison of the attitudes of employee owners and nonowners (Long, 1978a) , and (c) comparison of matched employee-owned and conventionally-owned firms (Greenberg 1980; Rhodes & Steers, 1981; Russell, Hochner, & Perry, 1979) . This research has yielded inconsistent, and thus inconclusive, results. In addition, the generalizability of the studies is limited. The studies are all based on small (often single-site) samples of worker cooperatives, direct purchase employee buyouts, or employee stock purchase plans. These forms of employee ownership require employees to purchase stock and are often designed to save failing firms. Thus, they have relatively little in common with the vast majority of employee ownership companies in the United States (i.e., ESOPs in profitable firms); the purchase of stock in a cooperative, employee buyout, or employee stock purchase plan may create, or reflect, dynamics and expectations very different from the receipt of stock as an ESOP benefit. Finally, much of the research suffers methodological problems stemming from the use of employee ownership status or shares as an individual-level independent variable. This measure may be confounded with employee salary, tenure, status, and pre-employee ownership commitment to the company.
The second model is the instrumental satisfaction model of employee ownership. According to this view, employee ownership increases employee influence in company decision making (Stein, 1976) , which in turn increases employee commitment. Proponents ofthis model suggest that employee ownership has a positive impact on employee attitudes if the company provides significant opportunities for worker participation in decision making (Hammer & Stern, 1980; Long, 1978a Long, , 1978b Long, , 1979 Tannenbaum, 1983) . This model is sometimes described as the "indirect effects" model of employee ownership (Tannenbaum, 1983) .
Research testing the instrumental satisfaction model of employee ownership closely parallels research on the intrinsic satisfaction model. To test the model, researchers have either assessed the relation between ownership shares and employee perceptions of worker influence, or compared employee-owned and nonemployee-owned firms. Indeed, many of the same studies tested both models (Hammer & Stern, 1980; Lon~ 1978a; Rhodes & Steers, 1981; Russell et al., 1979) . As with the first model, the research results are often inconsistent, confounded (again, due to the operationalization of employee ownership), and of limited generalizability (again, due to sample size and employee ownership type). Conte and Tannenbaum's (1978) research examining the relation between the percentage of employee ownership in a company and management's perceptions of worker influence in a sample of 98 employee-owned companies stands out as an exception to this general rule. Unfortunately, this study did not include any measure of employee perceptions.
The final model of employee ownership effects, the extrinsic satisfaction model, suggests that employee ownership increases organizational commitment if employee ownership is financially rewarding to employees. Surprisingly, this model is rarely discussed in employee ownership theory and it has never been tested empirically. Descriptive data on employees' perceptions of the benefits of employee ownership (French & Rosenstein, 1984; Hochner & Granrose, 1985; Long, 1978a; Rosen et al., 1986) lend support to the model, however. The model is further supported by research on pay systems, which documents the importance of financial rewards as a determinant of job satisfaction and organizational choice (Heneman, 1984; Lawle~ 1971 Lawle~ , 1981 . In the language of Katz and Kahn (1978) , an ESOP is a "system reward" that may increase employee commitment and decrease employee turnover.
In addition, the extrinsic satisfaction model is consistent with the economic literature on principal and agent relations (Berhold, 1971; Jensen & Meclding, 1976; Lewellen, 1971; Williamson, 1985; Wilson, 1968) , which suggests that financial incentives such as merit pay, gainsharing, and--by extension--employee ownership, may make agents' (i.e., employees') utility interests compatible with those ofthe principal (i.e., the owner). Also potentially relevant is the economics literature on rational expectations (Fischer, 1977; Muth, 1961; Phelps & Taylot~ 1977; Taylor, 1983) , which examines the extent to which individuals accurately anticipate future macroeconomic trends and--again, by extension--the performance of their own company's stock. A full evaluation and integration of these economic theories with the psychological literature on reward systems and employee ownership is, however, beyond the scope of this article.
In sum, the three employee ownership models provide a useful heuristic for conceptualizing the impact of employee ownership on employees (cir. Elizur, 1984) . Unfortunately, employee ownership research testing the models has thus far shed little light on the dynamics and effects of employee ownership, particularly in ESOP firms. As a result, the relevance of the three models to ESOP employee ownership is an open question. In the absence of research and theory on ESOPs per se, however, it seems reasonable to turn to the non-ESOP employee ownership literature for preliminary guidelines and hypotheses. Whether the company is a cooperative, direct purchase employee buyout, or ESOP, the simple fact--the idea--of employee ownership may be important to employees (as the intrinsic satisfaction model suggests). Similarly, regardless of employee ownership form, employees may respond favorably to opportunities to participate in company decision making (instrumental satisfaction) or to the possibility of financial gain (extrinsic satisfaction). Thus, the three models provide an appropriate starting point for ESOP theory building and research.
The Present Study
The present study tests the three employee ownership models by examining the relations between ESOP characteristics and employee attitudes. As such, the study examines ESOP and company characteristics as correlates of company differences in average employee satisfaction with the F.SOP, organizational commitment, and turnover intention.
Because the employee ownership models were originally conceived and developed to describe non-ESOP forms of employee ownership, they require some modification in the present context. The intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction models are readily applicable to ESOP firms. The instrumental satisfaction model requires greater modification. For ease of presentation, I discuss the intrinsic and extrinsic satisfaction models first and then turn to a discussion of the instrumental satisfaction model. The intrinsic satisfaction model suggests that ownership itself is the critical variable for employee morale in employee ownership companies; the more ownership, the better. According to this model, then, the more company stock that the ESOP owns, the more satisfied employees should be with the ESOP and, to the extent that employees' feelings about the ESOP generalize to positive feelings about the company as a whole, the higher the employees' organizational commitment and the lower their turnover intentions.
The extrinsic satisfaction model of ESOP effects suggests that the financial benefits of employee ownership are most important for employee satisfaction. Two ESOP characteristics determine how lucrative an ESOP is for the ESOP participants: (a) the size of the company contribution to the ESOP and (b) the return on company stock. The size of the company contribution to the ESOP is calculated as a percentage of employee salary; the larger a company's ESOP contribution, the larger the percentage of salary each company employee acquires through the ESOP. The return on company stock also influences the value of employees' ESOP accounts. If the price of company stock increases, employees' stock accounts are more valuable. Thus, the extrinsic satisfaction model predicts that both the size of the company contribution to the ESOP and stock return are positively related to satisfaction with stock ownership and organizational commitment, and negatively related to turnover intention.
The instrumental satisfaction model posits that employee ownership causes an increase in worker participation, which, in turn, increases employees' organizational commitment and decreases their turnover intentions. The first assumption (that employee ownership causes an increase in worker participation) is inappropriate for the study of ESOP firms, however. Privately held ESOP firms are not required to offer ESOP participants full voting rights. Publicly held firms must offer ESOP participants voting rights, but the ESOP participants are often a small minority among a larger body of public shareholders. Further, there is no evidence to show that ESOP firms are significantly more participative than non-ESOP firms, nor that ESOP firms in which employees own a large percentage of stock are more participative than ESOP firms in which employees own a small percentage of stock.
Nevertheless, the instrumental satisfaction model may have important implications for ESOP firms. The model assumes not only that employee ownership increases worker participation, but also that worker participation increases organizational commitment. This latter assumption is appficable to ESOP firms. If it is correct, then any ESOP characteristic that increases or is associated with employee influence and participation may prove critical for employee satisfaction with the ESOP, as well as with the company as a whole.
Which ESOP characteristics may be expected to increase employee influence? Stock voting rights is the most obvious. Even if voting fights do not guarantee employees much influence (e.g., if employees hold a minority of stock, or if few questions come to a vote), ESOP companies that offer employees voting rights may be more participative than those that do not. Management's decision to offer employees voting rights may reflect a larger commitment on the part of management to involve employees in company decision making through formal or informal mechanisms above and beyond stock voting rights.
Three other ESOP characteristics may also be associated with worker participation and influence. The first is the reason why the company estabfished its ESOP. The assumption here (as before) is that management's reason for ESOP adoption is indicative of, or at least associated with, management style. For example, a company that establishes an ESOP to achieve tax savings Note. ESOP = employee stock ownership plan. may be less likely to be highly participative than a company that establishes an ESOP to avoid a plant shutdown or to realize rnanagement's commitment to worker participation and ownership. Second, management's overall employee ownership philosophy may also be associated with worker participation in company decision making. As before, the more committed that management is to employee ownership as a part of its corporate culture and identity, the more participative the company is likely to be. The final factor is the extent of company communications to employees about the ESOP. An extensive ESOP communications program may also be associated with employee influence and participation insofar as it, like the preceding instrumental satisfaction variables, is indicative of management's larger commitment to employee involvement. In sum, the instrumental satisfaction model predicts that voting fights, ESOP reason, and ESOP communications are all significantly related to the employee outcomes and that the level of worker influence in the company mediates these relations.
The three models thus present three alternative, but complementary, sets of hypotheses about the effects of ESOP employee ownership on employee satisfaction with stock ownership, organizational commitment, and turnover intentions. The three models are summarized in Table 1 .
Method

Participants
Data analyses are based on the responses of 2,804 ESOP participants in 37 ESOP companies. The data were collected between May 1982 and November 1984, under the auspices of the National Center for Employee Ownership. Approximately 69% of the respondents were men, and approximately 31% were women. Approximately 91% were White. Almost all ofthe resixmdents (92.64%) had completed high school, and nearly 29% had completed college. Average employee tenure was 7.04 years (SD ffi 7.53), and the average respondent was 37.10 years old (SDffi 11.71) . Of the respcmdents, 34% earned between $10,000 and $20,000 a year and 29% earned between $20,000 and $30,000 a year. Approximately 13% earned more t hsn $40,000 a ycsr.
Sampling
At the time of the study, no comprehensive list of ESOP companies was available. Instead, with the assistance of the staff of the National Center for Employee Ownership and student research assistants, I used government and private lists of more than 2,500 ESOP firms to locate potential study companies. Of the approximately 75 ESOP firms that were randomly contacted, 37 agreed to participate in the research. Approximately 10% of the companies that refused to participate said they were undergoing serious financial troubles and they either did not want to be bothered at the time or did not want to survey employees when morale was low. Other companies refused to participate because company management did not think the timing was right for an employee survey, did not think the research was appropriate for their company, or had a policy of refusing all research requests.
Of the participating companies, 22 were located on the west coast, 9 on the east coast, and 6 in other parts of the United States. Nineteen were primarily manufacturing firms, 8 were professional service companies, and 10 were retail or wholesale outfits. All of the companies had established their ESOPs at least 1 year prior to the employee survey.
The average ESOP was 6.05 years old (SD = 2.85) at the time of the employee survey.
On the basis of existing comparison data (ESOP Association, 1982; Marsh & McAllister, 1981) , the company sample appears to be fairly representative of the population of ESOP companies. Howeve~ the sample may be biased insofar as (a) some less profitable companies declined to participate, (b) more than one third of the sample companies were majority employee owned, and (e) the sample is composed of firms in which management was sufficiently interested in or concerned about the ESOP to want to participate in the research.
Procedures
A key managerial respondent (the chief executive officer, vice president, or personnel director) in each company was interviewed for hackground about the company and the ESOP. This individual was typically recommended by the firm for his or her knowledge of the ESOP, as well as for his or her decision-making authority and general knowledge of the firm. The semistructured interview lasted from 1 to 2 hours, and yielded information on ESOP characteristics, basic company characteristics, and management-perceived worker influence. Most of these items (e.g., percentage of company owned by the ESOP, ESOP voting rights, company size) were factual, although several (reason for the ESOP, employee ownership philosophy, and management-perceived worker influence) were potentially subject to individual biases in perception and recollection.
Surveys were distributed to all or--in companies with more than 400 employees--to a random sample of company employees. The average employee response rate in each company was 55.13% (SD = 17.15).
Employees received a cover letter that explained the purpose of the research and assured employees that their answers were anonymous and their participation voluntary. Employees also received a letter from a company management official encouraging them to answer the survey. In return for participation in the research, each company received feedback on its results.
Measures of Employee Stock Ownership Plan Characteristics
Percentage of company stock owned. Percentage of company stock owned was the number of shares owned by the ESOP relative to the total number of company shares in circulation at the time of the employee survey.
The size of the annual companp contribution. The size of the annual company contribution was the average amount of cash or stock that the company contributed to the ESOP trust in the 3 years preceding the employee survey, expressed as a percentage of the covered employee payroll. In companies that instituted an ESOP less than 3 years before the employee survey, or that failed to provide the contribution data for all 3 years, contribution data for 1 or 2 years were used as appropriate and available. In earlier analyses reported in Rosen et al. (1986) , the company contribution for only the single year preceding the employee survey was used. The two contribution measures are correlated .91 (p < .01).
Stock return. To measure the performance ofcompany stock, I calculated the 2-year stock return (i.e., the percentage change in the value of company stock during the 2-year period preceding the employee survey). This procedure follows established measures of stock return (Brealey & Myers, 1984) , but excludes any measure of stock dividends because none of the sample companies gave out dividends. In privately held ESOP firms (n = 30 in the sample), the value of company stock is independently valued once a year. Thus, stock prices fluctuate from year to year, not from month to month or day to day. To assess stock change in publicly held firms (n = 7 in the sample), I used the stock price at year end, assessing year to year, not month to month or day to day, changes.
Voting rights. Companies were binary coded to indicate whether the company gave ESOP participants full voting rights.
Reason for the plan. The managerial respondent indicated the primary reason the company established an ESOP from a list of seven reasons: (a) employee benefit, (b) employee incentive, (e) financial and tax purposes, (d) philosophical commitment, (e) avoiding a shutdown, (f) business transfer from existing shareholder(s) to employees, and (g) purchase of the company during a corporate divestiture. The ESOP reason was dummy coded for statistical analyses.
Employee ownership philosophy. To measure management's philosophical commitment to employee ownership, the key managerial respondent answered a scale consisting of three items, each using a 7-point response scale. The three items were "Employee ownership is a central part of our management philosophy;' "Employee ownership plays a major role in our corporate culture and identity;' and "For our company, the employee ownership plan is primarily a tax-saving or financing mechanism" (reverse scored). The respondents answers were averased for the overall employee ownership philosophy score.
Communications about the plan. To measure the extent to which management attempts to inform and educate employees about the ESOP, managerial respondents noted which ESOP communications strategies the company used from a checklist of 12 ESOP communications strategies (e.g., employee ownership discussed in initial orientation for employees, annual meeting for employee stockholders, employee r vnership mentioned in company letterhead). The score was a count of how many communications methods the company used.
Measures of Worker Influence
To test the instrumental satisfaction model of ESOP effects, three measures of worker l~,'tieipation and influence were included in the study.
Management-perceived worker influence. The key managerial re-
spondent in each company rated the amount of influence nonmanagerial employees had over seven areas of company decision making (e.g., social events, working conditions, selection of supervisors and management, company financial policy). Managerial respondents rated employee influence over each area on a 5-point scale that ranged from
Workers have no say (1) to Workers decide alone (5). The scale score was the average of the respondent's answers to each of the seven items. This measure was adapted from Kwoka (1976) .
Employee-perceived worker influence. Employee respondents completed the same scale as above. Thus, the same items were used to measure both management-perceived and employee-perceived worker influence. The scale for the key managerial res~ndent appeared in the management interview, whereas the scale for all employees appeared in the employee survey.
Formal worker participation groups. I used Tannenbaum, Cook, and Lohmann's (1984) scale to measure the formal, established mechanisms for company decision making. The scale was completed by the key managerial respondent at each company. The scale asked whether the company had "any active working groups or committees" pertaining to seven substantive areas (e.g., quality control, strategic planning, budget and financial control). The items were scored to reflect whether each committee included the chief executive officer (1 point), other managerial or supervisory person(s) (2 additional points), and nonsupervisory person(s) (3 additional points), and the items were summed for the total scale score.
Measures of Basic Company Characteristics
To describe the firms and test alternative explanations of the main research results, I collected information on the following basic company characteristics:
Company size. Company size was the number of full-time employees in the company at the time of the employee survey.
Annual sales. Annual sales were the company's total annual sales for the last fiscal year preceding the employee survey.
Unionization. Companies were binary coded to indicate whether any of the company's employees were represented by a union.
Public or private status. Companies were binary coded to indicate whether the company was publicly or privately held.
Shared financial information.
During the management interview, the key managerial respondent was asked whether the company shared financial information about company performance (e.g., quarterly and annual reports) with nonmanagerial employees. Companies were binary coded accordingly.
Measures of Employee Attitude Dependent Variables
The three dependent variable measures that follow each used multiple items with a 7-point response scale. Scale scores were created by averaging employee responses to the items in each scale.
Satisfaction with theplan. Eight items measured ESOP partidpants'
satisfaction with stock ownership. Relying on factor analyses, reliability tests, and conceptual analyses, I formed this scale from an original list of 18 items about employee ownership. The original items were adapted from existing reports of the effects of employee ownership (e.g., Conte & Tannenbaum, 1978; Hammer & Stern, 1980) and pilot tested in two firms not included in the present data set. Items in the final scale included "It is very important to me that this company has an employee stock ownership plan;' "Owning stock in this company makes me want to stay with this company longer than I would if I did not own stock" and "Owning stock in this company makes me more interested in the company's financial success"
Organizationalcommitment. The short form (nine positively worded items) of Mowday, Steers, and Porter's ( 1979 ) scale measured organizational commitment.
Turnover intention. A three-item scale from the Michigan Organizational Assessment Questionnaire (Cammann, Fichman, Jenkins, & Klesh, 1983 ) measured turnover intention.
Level of Analysis
The company is the unit of analysis for all ofthe statistical tests. The dependent variables are the mean company scores on each employee attitude measure (ESOP satisfaction, organizational commitment, and Beyond this conceptual argument, use of the company level of analysis is supported by several specifics of ESOP practice and structure. First, an ESOP is a companywide intervention that management typically establishes in part to influence employees as a group (e.g., to improve overall company morale). As a result, the company level of analysis is most practically relevant to ESOP firms. Second, once an individual is employed by an ESOP firm, participation in the ESOP is not a matter of individual choice. Instead, employees are usually automatically included in the ESOP after I year of service with the company. As such, it is rarely appropriate to compare owners and nonowners within an ESOP firm (as might be the case in individual.level analyses). And third, within any single company, the amount of stock owned by the individual is a function of his or her salary and tenure. Thus, tests of the relation between the degree of individual ownership and ESOP satisfaction may effectively be tests of the relation between salary and tenure and ESOP satisfaction. Such analyses fail to test ESOP characteristic effects.
The results of one-way analyses of variance (^NOV^S), presented in Table 2 , lend additional support to the choice to use the company level of analysis. The between-company variance in the outcome measures is highly significant, indicating both within-company agreement and between-company variance in ESOP satisfaction, or~aniTational commitment, and turnover intention.
The company-level analyses reported in this study should not be interpreted as representative ofindividual-level findings (Glick & Roberts, 1984 ). Analyses at the company level of analysis effectively remove individual-level, within-company variance from consideration. Thus, for example, squared correlations based on the company mean scores show only the proportion of the bctween-cornpany variance that has been explained, not the proportion of the total within-and between-company variance that has been explained.
Given within-company variance in the dependent measures, the observed relations between ESOP or company characteristics and the aggregated dependent variables are likely to be stronger (greater in magnitude) than the relations one would find between these variables at the individual level of analysis. This reflects the fact that an individual's score on the dependent variable can be partitioned into two components: (a) the mean company score on the dependent variable (i.e., the between-company component), and Co) unique individual factors (i.e., the within-company component). Not surpri.~ingly, knowing the characteristics of a given ESOP allows one to predict the average company level of ESOP satisfaction more accurately than one can predict the ESOP satisfaction of any specific employee within that company.
In spite of the larger magnitude of the results of company-level analyses, the results of individual-level analyses are often statistically si~ifi-cant at a lower probability level because of the larger sample (e.g., 37 companies vs. 2,804 individuals). These kinds of differences between company-level and individual-level analyses and results should be kept in mind in evaluating the present study results. Finally, it is important to understand that the optimal way to analyze cruss-level data remains a matter of continuing debate (Glick, 1980; Glick & Roberts, 1984; Pedhazur, 1982; Rousseau, 1985) .
Results
As preliminary background information, Table 3 lists the sample number, Cronbach's alpha, mean, standard deviation, and range of company scores for all continuous variables. Table  4 describes the numerical breakdown for the nominal study variables. A full correlation table of all of the study variables appears in Appendix A. Table 5 shows the correlations among the employee outcome measures and the ESOP characteristics. (In Tables 5 and 6 , rs are reported for all continuous and dichotomous variables and, for ease of comparison, eta is listed for each ANOVA using ESOP reason, the only dummy-coded ESOP characteristic. Analyses of voting fights use the point biserial correlation.) Not surprisingly, the three outcome measures (ESOP satisfaction, organizational commitment, and turnover intention) are highly intercorrelated. Accordingly, one can expect analyses across the three measures to yield consistent results. Conversely, with a few exceptions discussed ahead, the ESOP characteristics are not significantly intercorrelated. Table 5 provides a preliminary test of the three employee ownership models. Three of the ESOP characteristics are significantly related to the employee outcomes. Contribution is Note. ESOP ffi employee stock ownership plan.
Employee Stock Ownership Plan Characteristics and Employee Outcomes
positively related to ESOP satisfaction (r = .50, p < .01) and organizational commitment (r = .41, p < .05), and negatively related to turnover intention (r = -. 50, p < .01). Management's employee ownership philosophy shows a similar pattern of results. It too is positively related to ESOP satisfaction (r = .49, p < .01) and organizational commitment (r = .49, p < .01), and negatively related to turnover intention (r = -.37, p < .05). Finally, ESOP communications is positively related to ESOP satisfaction (r = .40, p < .05) and negatively related to turnover intention (r ffi -.41, p < .05). These results provide some sup- Note. ESOP = employee stock ownership plan.
9 Data are missing for three companies. 
Size of the Company Contribution to the Plan
I turn first to the contribution results and a closer examination of the extrinsic satisfaction model of employee ownership. Does the extrinsic satisfaction model offer the best explanation of the contribution results, or is some other explanation equally or more plausible?
The results in Table 5 indicate that contribution is not significantly related to employee ownership philosophy or ESOP communications. Further, the results in Table 6 indicate that contribution is also not significantly related to any of the measures of basic company characteristics or of worker influence. One can thus conclude that the results in Table 5 linking contribution to the employee outcomes are not explained by any spurious relation between contribution and other ESOP or company characteristics. Partial correlations of contribution and the employee outcomes, controlling for the F_SOP and company characteristics listed in Tables 5 and 6 , substantiate this assertion. The partial correlations are listed in Appendix B.
Employee Ownership Philosophy and Communications About the Plan
Turning now to the results for employee ownership philosophy and ESOP communications, the instrumental satisfaction model suggests that the two variables should be positively re- lated not only to the employee outcomes, but also to the measures of worker influence. The data in Table 6 provide moderate support for this prediction. Management's employee ownership philosophy is significantly positively related to managementperceived worker influence (r ffi .41, p < .05), and ESOP communications is significantly related to employee-perceived worker influence (r --.35, p < .05). Furthe~ the remaining correlations between employee ownership philosophy and ESOP communications and the worker influence measures are in the predicted direction. The last tenet of the instrumental satisfaction model suggests that worker influence is positively related to employee satisfaction. The results in Table 6 also largely support this hypothesis. Management-perceived worker influence and employee-perceived worker influence are both sitmificantly related to ESOP satisfaction and organizational commitment, and the correlations between these two worker influence variables and turnover intention are in the predicted direction. The measure of formal participation groups is not, however, significantly related to the employee outcomes.
In sum, the correlations in Tables 6 suggest that--as the instrumental satisfaction model predicts--the relations between employee ownership philosophy and ESOP communications and the employee outcomes are at least partially mediated by worker influence. The hierarchical regressions reported in Table 7 provide a direct test of this hypothesis. (The analyses of employee ownership philosophy control for its significant correlate, management-perceived worker influence, whereas the analyses of ESOP communications control for its significant correlate, employee-perceived worker influence.)
The results in Table 7 indicate that after controlling for management-perceived worker influence, employee ownership phi- Note. Eta is fisted for each one-way analysis of variance using employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) reason. For voting rights, shared financial information, and unionization, no = 0 and yes = 1. *p < .05. **p < .01. Note. ESOP = employee stock ownership plan. *p < .05. **p < .01.
losophy remains significantly related to ESOP satisfaction and organizational commitment, although it is no longer significantly related to turnover intention. After controlling for employee-perceived worker influence, ESOP communications is significantly related to turnover intention, but is not significantly related to ESOP satisfaction. (The original correlation of ESOP communications and organizational commitment was not significant.) Thus, worker influence appears to explain much, but not all, of the effects of employee ownership philosophy and ESOP communications on the employee outcomes. (A full list of the partial correlations of both employee ownership philosophy and the employee outcomes, and of ESOP communications and the employee outcomes, controlling for ESOP and company characteristics, appears in Appendix C.)
Combined Effects of Contribution, Employee Ownership Philosophy, and Communications About the Plan
In conclusion, the results for contribution, employee ownership philosophy, and ESOP communications suggest that both the extrinsic and instrumental models of ESOP employee ownership are helpful in explaining the conditions under which ESOP employee ownership is associated with positive employee outcomes. Table 8 presents the results of multiple regression analyses examining the overall effects of the significant independent variables (contribution, employee ownership philosophy, and ESOP communications) on the employee outcomes. Because of the strong correlation between employee ownership philosophy and ESOP communications, I used a composite of these two variables (the z score of employee ownership philosophy plus the z score of ESOP communications) for the analyses (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) . The adjusted R 2 results show that together contribution, employee ownership philosophy, and ESOP communications explain between 25% and 39% of the variance in the average company scores for ESOP satisfaction, organizational commitment, and turnover intention.
Discussion
The research results indicate that, on the average, employees are most satisfied with employee ownership and most committed to their companies when the company makes large contributions to the ESOP, when management is highly committed to the concept of employee ownership, and when the company maintains an extensive ESOP communications program. These results support the extrinsic and instrumental satisfaction models of employee ownership. In contrast, the data offer no support for the intrinsic satisfaction model of employee ownership.
Extrinsic Satisfaction Model of Employee Ownership
Contribution. The size of the company contribution to the ESOP is significantly positively related to employee ESOP satisfaction and organizational commitment, and significantly negatively related to turnover intention. The strong effects of ESOP contribution are not explained by any other ESOP or basic company characteristic, nor by the measures of worker influence and participation. Finally, contribution is not subject to common method variance with the dependent variables. The contribution results, thus, strongly suggest that earning a large amount of money through the ESOP leads to positive employee attitudes.
Alternatively, positive employee attitudes might lead to large company contributions to the ESOP/fmanagement rewarded employee morale by making a large F.SOP contribution. Although possible, this chain of events is unlikely. Typically, management is guided by financial, legal, and practical considerations (e.g., the need to achieve tax savings, pay offan ESOP loan, or purchase a retiring owner's stock) in deciding the company's annual contribution to the ESOP.
Much of the literature on financial benefit plans suggests that group-and organization-wide benefit plans have tittle impact on individual productivity because the plans do not provide prompt rewards for individual work effort (i.e., the performance-to-outcome expectancy is low for these plans; Heneman, 1984; Lawler, 1981) . Although group-and organization-wide plans may have little influence on individual productivity, the results of the present study suggest that the impact of group benefits in general, and ESOPs in particular, on average employee attitudes in a company should not be underestimated. Finally, given that the size of the company contribution to the ESOP determines the relative benefit of the ESOP for company employees (i.e., the ratio of an employee's annual ESOP benefit to his or her salary), the contribution results suggest that the relative, rather than the absolute, size of an employee benefit may be most important for employee satisfaction with that benefit. Future researchers should examine this relative wealth issue more directly, determining, for example, whether a $5,000 ESOP account is meaningful and important to employees regardless of employee salary and total income, or whether the $5,000 ESOP account is more valued by employees with smaller salaries and incomes.
Stock return. Stock return is not significantly related to the employee outcomes. Given the contribution results, the stock return results are somewhat surprising. The most parsimonious explanation for the nonsignificant stock return results is that, compared to the size of the company contribution to the ESOP, the return on company stock has a relatively small influence on the financial rewards that employees receive from the ESOP. It is also possible, however, that a future study, with a larger sample of companies and hence greater statistical power, might find stock return a significant predictor of the employee outcomes; the results are in the predicted direction and they approach statistical significance (e.g., the correlation of stock return and organizational commitment is .29, p =. 10). Finally, the nonsignificant stock return results may reflect measurement error. Although stock return in privately held firms cannot be measured more precisely than I have measured it here (using stock prices as determined by the company's independent stock valuator), an alternative measure of stock return in pubficly held firms, accounting for daily, weekly, or monthly fluctuations in stock price, could be used in future research.
Instrumental Satisfaction Model of Employee Ownership
Employee ownership philosophy. Employee ownership philosophy, a measure of management's philosophical commitment to employee ownership, is significantly related to the employee outcomes. According to the instrumental satisfaction model, employee ownership philosophy shows this positive relation to the employee outcomes because it is also associated with employee influence, which in turn leads to employee satisfaction. The data largely support this interpretation as management-perceived worker influence does in fact partially mediate the relation between employee ownership philosophy and the employee outcomes.
Still, a few caveats are in order. First, the measure of management's employee ownership philosophy is subjective and amenable to social desirability effects. Second, contrary to predictions, employee ownership philosophy is not significantly related to employee-perceived worker influence nor to formal participation groups. Finally, the direction of causality linking employee ownership philosophy and the employee outcomes is uncertain. Managers may be supportive of employee ownership ideals precisely because their employees show high morale and commitment to the company. The relation between management's employee ownership philosophy and participative management practices deserves attention in future research.
Communications about the plan. ESOP communications is significantly positively related to ESOP satisfaction and significantly negatively related to turnover intention. The results are largely congruent with the instrumental satisfaction model. ESOP communications is significantly related to employee-perceived worker influence, and its relations to the other measures of worker influence are in the predicted direction. In addition, employee-perceived worker influence at least partially mediates the relation between ESOP communications and the employee outcomes. ESOP communications may also have direct effects on employee attitudes if company communications about the ESOP increase employee understanding of the ESOP and convince employees of management's commitment to the plan.
Stock voting rights. ESOP voting rights is not significantly
related to the employee outcomes. This result contradicts the instrumental satisfaction model. Two factors may explain this result. First, as noted earlier, ESOP stock voting rights often provide employees with relatively little power to influence company policies. (Note that voting rights is not significantly related to employee-perceived worker influence.) Second, statistical factors make it difficult to obtain a significant result. Voting rights is a dichotomous variable, whereas the outcome variables are interval scales. Dissimilarities in the shape of the distributions of the independent and dependent variables reduce the maximum possible correlation coefficient (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) .
Reason for theplan. ESOP reason is not significantly related to the employee outcomes or to the measures of worker influence and participation. This pattern of results also contradicts the instrumental model of ESOP satisfaction. Apparently, a company's stated reason for establishing an ESOP has little bearing on employee attitudes or management style. Three factors may help to explain the ESOP reason results. First, companies establish ESOPs for several reasons, not just one. Second, the division of ESOP reason into seven specific reasons is somewhat arbitrary. And third, because ESOP reason is dummy coded, it is relatively difficult to obtain significant results with a sample of 37 companies (e.g., a test of the relation of ESOP reason and ESOP satisfaction has dfi of 6 and 30).
Intrinsic Satisfaction Model of Employee Ownership
Percentage of employee ownership. The percentage of company stock owned by the ESOP is not significantly related to the average company scores on the employee outcomes. Nor is percentage significantly related to other ESOP characteristics (except ESOP reason) or to measures of worker influence and participation. The percentage results suggest that ESOP employee ownership is not intrinsically rewarding, that there must be an intervening variable--financial gain, participative management, or both--for ESOP employee ownership to be associated with employee satisfaction and commitment.
Conclusion
The contribution results provide strong support for the extrinsic satisfaction model of ESOP employee ownership: money matters. At the same time, the employee ownership philosophy and ESOP communications results suggest the powerful impact of management style on employee attitudes. The research results thus present a balanced picture of ESOP employee ownership. Although perhaps not intrinsically rewarding, ESOP employee ownership does appear to have a positive impact on average employee attitudes when it is coupled with significant financial rewards or participative management practices, or both.
For the growing number of researchers studying employee ownership, the present study answers many questions, but leaves many unanswered as well: Are the present study results generalizable to other forms of employee ownership---to cooperatives and to employee buyouts to save failing firms? Are the dynamics of employee ownership different when employees actually purchase stock--when stock is not a company gift to employees? Is employee satisfaction and commitment higher in employee-owned than in nonemployee-owned firms? Are ESOP companies more participative than non-ESOP firms? Do different kinds of employees (older, higher income, greater tenure) respond differently to employee ownership? These questions deserve attention in future research efforts.
For industrial and organizational psychology and related fields, the study has two broader implications. First, by documenting the impact of financial rewards on employee attitudes, the study invites additional research on compensation and benefit systems. Psychologists have tended to neglect this important area of study. (In contrast, participative management is the focus of considerable psychological research and theory.) Second, by examining the impact of company level policies and practices on employee attitudes, the study directs psychologists' attention to a new level of analysis and, hence, a new category of research variables. Industrial and organizational psychologists have typically examined the effects of individual-level variables (e.g., job characteristics) on individual attitudes. The present study suggests that it is possible, and indeed valuable, to examine the consequences of company-level factors on employee outcomes. Future research at the company level of analysis may prove practically useful as well, for managers and consultants may ultimately find it more effective to change global, company policies and practices than to address individual-level concerns and complaints. 
